The welfare effects of regulatory change on the Western Canadian grain handling and transportation system by Lisitza, Lyndon
  


























 In 1996, the federal government took a significant step toward redefining the regulatory framework for grain transportation on the Prairies with the passing of the Canadian Transportation Act (CTA). The CTA contained two significant aspects that were to have a major impact on the GHTS. The first aspect concerned rail line abandonment. Under the CTA, protections afforded to the discontinuance of grain dependent branchlines were removed. Instead, railways were simply required to generate a three‐year plan to indicate whether they intended to continue operating a branchline or whether they intended to sell, lease or abandon it. The second aspect was the introduction of regulated maximum freight rates, which removed the federal government from direct financial intervention in the GHTS. This policy was designed to replace the remnants of the long‐standing Crow rate for Canadian railways.  
  In order to determine if regulatory change has led to an overall improvement in GHTS welfare, and to determine if farmers have benefitted from regulatory change, this thesis examines the regulatory changes that have occurred since the passing of the Canada Transportation Act. To provide some context for this analysis, this thesis presents a historical overview of the legislation and regulations leading up to the passing of the Act and provided a historical and current description of the GHTS market structure. 
 Following the regulatory and industry overview, this thesis develops a theoretical framework capable of determining whether regulatory change has led to an overall 
   iii 
improvement in GHTS welfare and, if so, which industry participants have benefitted from this change. To help contextualize many of the concepts used in the theoretical framework, this thesis examines theories on the origin of regulation and looked specifically at two forms of thought: public interest theory and capture theory. As well, this thesis examines several ‘rate of return’ regulatory options available to the regulator, and provides an illustration of the ‘rate of return’ regulation of the WGTA in order to provide a regulatory baseline against which the 1996 CTA regulatory changes can be assessed. 
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 The 1996 CTA identified competition and market forces as drivers that would make the GHTS more viable and efficient. It also recognized that effective competition does not exist in the rail industry and that government regulation was needed to achieve competitive market outcomes. To this end, the CTA implemented various forms of incentive regulations, such as a revenue cap, multi‐car block incentives and changes to the branchline abandonment procedures that were intended to result in greater economic efficiency and welfare within the GHTS.   While several studies suggest that the 1996 CTA regulatory changes have resulted in increased efficiency for the Class 1 railways and large grain handling firms operating within the GHTS, it is unclear whether these changes have resulted in overall welfare gains for the entire system (Quorum, 2010; Travacon, 2010). Attempts to measures GHTS improvements, such as those conducted by the Federal Grain Monitor, tend to gauge system progress in terms of the improvements made in technical efficiency made by the railways and grain handling firms. While these metrics are excellent at summarizing year over year railway operational performance, they provide little insight as to how, or if, the benefit of improved system efficiency are shared amongst GHTS stakeholders. These metrics also fail to capture the presence and costs of negative externalities resulting from the rationalization of the GHTS.  
   9 
1.4 Study Objectives    This thesis examines the regulatory changes that have occurred since the passing of the Canada Transportation Act to determine if regulatory change has led to an overall improvement in GHTS welfare and if all system stakeholders have benefitted from these changes.1 Before this examination can begin, this thesis presents a historical overview of the legislation and regulations leading up to the passing of the CTA, a physical and spatial description of the GHTS, and a current description of the GHTS structure.   Establishing a connection between regulatory reform and overall system welfare may lead to suggestions for change if it can be determined that regulatory reform has negatively influenced the structure and efficiency of the GHTS. To this end, this thesis has two main objectives. First, this thesis presents a comprehensive physical description of the system, including an outline of the current and historical regulatory structure of the GHTS. Second, this thesis presents a theoretical framework that can be used in the design of analytical tests capable of examining these two null hypotheses:   1) The regulatory changes contained in the CTA have not lead to an overall improvement of the grain handling and transportation system.    2) The majority of farmers have not benefitted from the regulatory reform.   Note that these hypotheses have been stated as null hypotheses – i.e., that regulatory change has had no impact on system efficiency and/or the welfare of farmers. 
                                                        
1 It is important to note that his thesis places a greater emphasis on the regulatory and welfare changes that 
occur in the grain transportation sector (i.e., movement of grain by road and rail) and less so on the grain 














































4 The extent to which the bid price can be lowered is limited, however. If local bid prices fall by too much, 
then local sellers will simply ship their grain farther away. If one local buyer decides to lower price 





























































































6 Rosaasen and Schmitz (1985) estimate the true value of the lost Crow benefit to be three to four times 























































































































































                        
 


























































































































to exceed   X, which will normally be the case for a profit maximizing firm) the problem can be expressed as follows:                       (4.3) 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The welfare impacts associated with making improvements in railway technical efficiency in order to lower marginal costs are shown in Figure 4.8. Prior to the efficiency improvements, railway producer surplus is equal to the area a + b. As railways invest in efficiency improvements and the marginal cost of the railway declines from (MC) to (MC’), the railway producer surplus increases by area c + d.   An additional note of interest from Figure 4.8 is that the reduction in railway marginal cost has no impact on the consumer surplus received in either the grain and non‐grain markets. As such, the benefits associated with improvements in railway technical efficiency can be considered the strict property of the railways and are not shared with consumers of transportation services in either the grain or non‐grain markets if they are used only as a means of reducing railway marginal cost.   The exclusivity of benefits is not the case in instances where the efficiency improvements made by the rail firm are used to produce a higher quantity of outputs with the same amounts of inputs or factors of production. As shown in Figure 4.9, if railway efficiency improvements are aimed at producing a higher quantity of outputs with the same amounts of inputs, as output increases there is an increase in the total capacity of the system from   X to  X’. Assuming that there is no change in demand in the non‐grain sector, the demand curve (Dng) and marginal revenue curve (MRng) in the non‐grain sector – which are anchored to the non‐grain axis – are repositioned as (Dng’) and (MRng’).  From this model, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, as system capacity increases, the ability of the railway to fully serve the capacity needs of the grain market also increases. Whereas prior to the capacity shift, the railways optimal capacity allocation between markets was set at XT, after the capacity shift the new optimal capacity becomes X’T.    Second, as capacity in the system increases, so too does the producer surplus earned 
   91 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14 Railway profits shown in Table 5.7 are a compendium of the different railway market segments and are 
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 Shippers in the non‐grain market see a marked increase in consumer surplus as capacity is allocated away from the grain market in favour of the non‐grain market. The resulting shift in capacity allocation results in lower average freight costs for non‐grain shippers. As such, shippers in the non‐grain markets are made better off.  The railways see an overall decrease in producer surplus. This welfare loss is partly due to the decrease in price in the grain market as the new regulatory regime is implemented and partly due to lower prices in the non‐grain market that result due to the increase of capacity allocation in the non‐grain market. As such, the welfare changes associated with moving from the WGTA to the revenue cap regulatory regime means that, with all other factors being equal or held constant, the railways are worse off. 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As indicated in Table 6.3, between 1994 and 2000 there was a substantial decrease in the total volume of tonne miles shipped through the GHTS. The difference in the grain volumes shipped under the WGTA and the revenue cap makes it difficult to conduct a welfare analysis in the high and low cost market – ceteris paribus – that accurately outlines the changes in consumer surplus resulting from the regulatory change. To overcome the discrepancy in freight volumes, this thesis conducts the welfare analysis using two distinct scenarios. Scenario one examines the change in consumer surplus in both the high and low cost markets by calculating the loss in consumer surplus that grain shippers would experience with the freight volumes 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The column in Table 6.4 labeled “Consumer Surplus Change” outlines the consumer surplus (measured in dollars) under each of the scenarios outlined above. Taking the consumer surplus of shippers under Scenario 1 (i.e., using WGTA demand) as an example, the results indicate that high cost shippers paying the single car rate lost $504.2 million compared with the consumer surplus they would have earned under the WGTA. In the low cost markets, shippers lose $40.0 million in consumer surplus compared to what they would have earned if WGTA freight costs remained in effect. In total, the total loss of consumer surplus in Scenario 1 is calculated at $544.2 million. Under Scenario 2 (i.e., using demand under the revenue cap) the results indicate that high cost shippers paying the single car rate lost $248.5 million compared with the consumer surplus they would have earned if WGTA freight costs remained in 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change.   While the precise changes in producer and consumer surplus resulting from the increase in system capacity and the removal of GDBL’s are unknown, based on the theoretical models developed in Chapter 4 and the knowledge that the total tonne miles in the grain market decreased between 1994 and 2000, it is reasonable to assume that the welfare estimates provided in Table 6.9 underestimates the losses to grain shippers and benefits to railways and non‐grain shippers. As well, by ignoring the externalities that inevitably arise as haul distances increase, it is likely that these results overestimate social gains.  However, when considering the welfare effects solely attributed to the regulatory shift in both the differentiated and non‐differentiated case, it is clear that the move from the WGTA to the revenue cap decreases the consumer surplus of farmers. In instances where the railways do not differentiate between grain shippers, the grain market sees a $418.2 million reduction in consumer surplus, largely due to the fact that the price farmers’ pay for grain transportation has risen and because the level of output they receive is less than what they received under the WGTA. 
 In instances where the railways differentiate between shippers, the loss in consumer surplus becomes more pronounced. Grain shippers – and ultimately farmers – experience a loss in overall welfare between $427.8 million and $544.2 million. While shippers in the low cost market experience a reduction in consumer surplus, the loss in consumer surplus is more pronounced amongst shippers in high cost markets, largely due to the substantial price difference between the single car rate shippers are required to pay under the revenue cap and the price enjoyed under the WGTA. As such, farmers are worse off in circumstances where the railways are able to differentiate between high and low cost shippers compared to instances where differentiation does not take place.  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 Source – Author’s Calculations20  Shippers in the non‐grain market see a $797.7 million gain in consumer surplus as a result of the regulatory shift. This increase is principally due to a shift in capacity allocation from the grain to the non‐grain market as the railways respond to the lower average marginal revenues they are able to earn in the revenue cap regulated grain market. As such, shippers in the non‐grain market are made better off. 
 Although the railways experience a $797.2 million loss in producer surplus due to the regulatory shift, the results show that this loss is more than offset by the increase in producer surplus that the railways earn through reducing marginal costs. In these regards, the railways see a gain in producer surplus of $1,219.0 million.  In addition to the gains of the railways and non‐grain shippers, taxpayer also experiences a $572.9 million gain in surplus. These gains are the result of the elimination of the subsidy that was paid to the railways under the WGTA. In addition to the gains experienced by taxpayers, society also gains as the additional dead weight loss that is incurred by society from raising the taxes required to pay the subsidy that was removed.                                                            
20 Not included in this analysis is the producer surplus earned by shortline railways operating within the 
GHTS. However, give that shortline railways typically operate at a breakeven point (i.e., zero profit), this is 
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 The effects of these reforms have been a thorough restructuring of the GHTS. Between 1995 and 2009, the Class 1 railways have discontinued 2,522 route miles of grain dependent branch lines from their railway system (CTA, 2009). During the same period the total number of grain elevators across the prairies has decreased 76 per cent, from 1,339 to 320, as grain handling companies replaced small wooden elevators in favour of large, concrete high throughput elevators (CGC Grain Elevators in Canada, 2009). 
 While the rationalization of the rail and grain handling network has allowed some system stakeholder to benefit – the Class 1 railways have seen operating costs decline, while the switch to HTEs have allowed grain handling companies to improve upon grain handling to elevator capacity ratios (e.g., turnover ratio) – it is unclear whether rationalization has lead to an overall improvement in GHTS welfare (Quorum, 2003). The reduction in grain dependent branch lines and fewer 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elevator delivery points means that many of the transportation costs associated with grain movement have simply shifted away from railways and elevators towards producer. (Storey, The Encyclopedia of Saskatchewan, 2006).  
 In order to determine if regulatory change has led to an overall improvement in GHTS welfare, and to determine if farmers have benefitted from regulatory change, this thesis examined the regulatory changes that have occurred since the passing of the Canada Transportation Act. To provide some context for this analysis, this thesis began with a historical overview of the legislation and regulations leading up to the passing of the Act and provided a historical and current description of the GHTS market structure. 
 Following the regulatory and industry overview, this thesis developed a theoretical framework capable of determining whether regulatory change has lead to an overall improvement in GHTS welfare and, if so, which industry participants have benefitted from this change. To help contextualize many of the concepts used in the theoretical framework, this thesis examined theories on the origin of regulation and looked specifically at two forms of thought: public interest theory and capture theory. As well, this thesis examined several ‘rate of return’ regulatory options available to the regulator, and provided an illustration of the ‘rate of return’ regulation of the WGTA in order to provide a regulatory baseline against which the 1996 CTA regulatory changes could be assessed. 
 After examining the theory behind regulation, this research developed a series of theoretical models to analyze the economic impacts of regulatory change on the GHTS. As a means of measuring the effects of regulatory change on the GHTS welfare, this thesis looked at industry pricing and service levels in both grain and non‐grain markets to determine the welfare gains or losses of system participants prior to and after the regulatory changes contained in the 1996 CTA. Specifically, these models were designed to examine the welfare effects resulting from the elimination of grain dependent branchlines and the introduction of the revenue cap. 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7.2 Model 
 The model developed in this thesis allows a measurement of the welfare changes arising from two key regulatory changes: the introduction of the revenue cap and the removal of GDBLs. The concepts of consumer and producer surplus are used to determine if the regulatory changes have had a positive or negative impact in both the grain and non‐grain markets. The concepts of consumer and producer surplus are also used to determine how regulatory change has affected the welfare of different participants in the grain and non‐grain markets and which groups have benefitted the most from regulatory change. 
 Specifically, the model breaks down the welfare effects of regulatory change into three distinct scenarios. For the purpose of this analysis, the welfare effects from each scenario are examined independently, with the resulting welfare changes in each scenario considered as being cumulative in the determination of the overall welfare effects resulting from regulatory change. 
 Common to all scenarios, a monopolist railway with a fixed network capacity provides service in two competing markets: grain and non‐grain. In the non‐grain market, the railway is not subject to any form of government regulation and is able to exercise monopoly power. The regulated grain market, however, has moved from a WGTA ‘rate of return’ regulatory scheme to revenue cap regulation. This scenario examines, with all other factors held constant, the welfare changes associated with shift from the WGTA to the revenue cap regulatory regime in instances where the railways are able to differentiate between high and low cost shippers and a situation where are shippers in the grain market are homogeneous. 
 Scenario two examines the welfare changes associated with gains in railway productivity. Specifically, two types of railway productivity gains are examined: 1) productivity gains that result in an increase in railway capacity; and 2) productivity gains that lead to a reduction in railway marginal cost. In each instance, the premise 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developed in scenario one is expanded to include a situation where total rail capacity – in terms of total system tonne miles – has increased and where the railway sees a reduction in marginal cost. 
 Scenario three examines the externality costs associated with the removal of GDBLs. Specifically, this scenario looks at two externalities arising from the removal of GDBLs: road damage costs and green house gas emissions. The external costs associated with the removal of GDBLs are determined by multiplying the additional tonne miles that farmers must haul grain due to the removal of GDBLs by the dollar per tonne mile GHG emissions cost and the dollar per tonne mile road damage cost for each tonne mile of grain shipped on the prairie road network as a result of GDBL abandonment. These results are added to the results of the previous scenarios as a means of determining the overall welfare costs associated with GHTS regulatory change. 
 
7.3 Results 
 The intent of this thesis was to quantify the changes in consumer and producer surplus associated with regulatory change. Specifically, this thesis examined the welfare changes in grain and non‐grain markets that can be attributed to the shift from the WGTA to revenue cap regulation (differentiated and non‐differentiated grain shippers), increased railway capacity, a reduction in railway marginal cost and the removal of GDBLs. 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from the results outlined in the previous chapter. The first is that on a net basis, the economic surplus available to the Canadian economy has increased as a result of the regulatory change. In essence, the size of the economic pie has increased. In total, the surplus change in the Canadian economy has increased between $1.45 billion and $1.56 billion dollars as a result of 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the change in GHTS regulation.  A second conclusion that can be drawn from the results in the previous chapter is that it is likely that the welfare estimates underestimate the losses to grain shippers and benefits to railways and non‐grain shippers. While welfare changes resulting from an increase in rail capacity, the removal of GDBL’s and system externalities were not determined, the theoretical models developed in Chapter 4 and knowledge pertaining to the decrease in grain market tonne miles between 1994 and 2000 strongly suggest that the results shown in Table 6.9 are undervalued.  A third conclusion that can be draw from the previous chapter’s results is that the economic impacts associated with the regulatory change went beyond those intended by the regulator, to the detriment of the farmers and GHTS (Karadininis and Storey, 1986). Overall, welfare gains associated with the regulatory change could have been higher if industry regulators had prevented, or at least limited, the railways from removing GDBLs from the system. The decision to eliminate GDBLs from the system should be viewed as an example of regulatory failure on the part of the regulator. Keeping the GDBLs in place and allowing the railways to increase freight rates on these lines to a level that covered railway shortfalls would have resulted in lower transportation costs for farmers, as well as reduced GHG emission and road damage costs resulting from increased trucking. 
 A fourth conclusion that can be derived from the results are that the distributions of the benefits associated with the regulatory change were not uniform. Some stakeholders identified in this analysis have gained more than others, while others have lost. Shippers in the non‐grain market have seen an overall increase in consumer surplus as capacity allocation has shifted from the grain to the non‐grain market. Shippers in the non‐grain market have also seen an increase in consumer surplus as a result of additional capacity being added to the system as the railways increase their overall productivity. In total, shippers in the non‐grain market are made better off. 
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 The railways are also clear beneficiaries of regulatory change. Although the railways experience a loss in producer surplus due to the regulatory shift, this loss is more than offset by the increase in producer surplus that the railways earn through increasing capacity, reducing marginal costs and removing GDBLs from the system. As such, the railways see a substantial gain in producer surplus. 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